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PREFERENCE CONUNDRUMS
JAMES J. WHITE*
DANIEL ISRAEL**
Every law teacher and many law students and practitioners under-
stand the intellectual sport to be found in Section 547 on preference law.
Because the preference rules are so intricate, rigorously logical-but re-
ally not logical-they command more than their fair attention, not only
in law school but also in continuing legal education and even in the
courts. Our purpose in this article is not to answer any of the difficult
questions or to give a global explanation of preference law. Rather it is
to confront a few of the conundrums in Section 547 and to follow the
paths of those conundrums a little farther into the bush than have others.
We concentrate on four preference problems. The first is the applica-
tion of 547(c)(5), the exception for after-acquired property. Second, we
examine the vitality of the old arguments that were used where
547(c)(5) is now used. Surprisingly some parts of those have survived
the enactment of the 1978 Code. Next we deal with the question when is
the hypothetical date of liquidation under (b)(5) and we conclude with a
first cousin of the Deprizio issue-the issues arising when a payment to
one creditor arguably causes a preference to another. Those interested in
answers should not look here. This is for those interested in playing in
the complexities of preference law.
I. AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY CONUNDRUM
Security interests in inventory and receivables are often referred to as
the creditor's "floating lien" (the metaphor "floating lien" because the
security floats upon and covers a shifting quantity and quality of prop-
erty sometimes described as a "moving stream"). New goods may be
substituted for old goods. Goods may change as they are processed or
manufactured into different goods. These, in turn, may be converted into
rights to payment, receivables. Because the debtor's inventory and re-
* James J. White is the Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law at the University of Michi-
gan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he teaches commercial transactions, contracts, bank-
ruptcy, banking law and negotiation among other subjects. He received his B.A. in 1956
from Amherst College and his J.D. in 1962 from the University of Michigan.
** Daniel Israel received his J.D. from the University of Michigan in May 1993 and his
B.A. in 1989 from Brown University. He will be an associate with the Cleveland, Ohio, law
firm of Baker & Hostetler beginning in August 1993.
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ceivables relating to a particular security interest constantly change, the
creditor's interest must "float" over the inventory and receivables.
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 substantial controversy surrounded
the floating lien.' Since an Article 9 security interest cannot attach or be
perfected until the debtor acquired "rights in the collateral," 2 trustees
under the Act argued that the transfer of the security interest in inven-
tory or receivables could not occur until specific items of inventory or
particular accounts were acquired or generated by the business. Thus,
security interests in inventory or accounts acquired or generated by the
debtor during the preference period3 could not be transferred until each
individual item or account came into the debtor's hands. Since the trans-
fer would usually be after the creditor had given value and while the
debtor was insolvent, the trustee in bankruptcy could set aside the se-
cured creditor's interest in inventory and receivables acquired during the
preference period-so said the trustee.
The courts did not agree. In DuBay v. Williams" the court gave com-
plete effect to the creditor's after-acquired property clause. The court
determined that "perfection" for bankruptcy purposes could occur before
attachment under Article 9. It stated that the transfer of the security
interest to the secured creditor was deemed to have occurred when the
creditor filed its financing statement, a time that might long precede the
preference period.6 Following cases such as DuBay, courts routinely al-
lowed all security interests in inventory and receivables to escape the
reach of the trustee in bankruptcy.6
Section 547(c)(5) is the 1978 Code response to DuBay et al. One of
the six limitations to 547(b), Section 547(c)(5) exempts certain transfers
of after-acquired property from avoidance.
To see the need for 547(c)(5), one must first understand how a "float-
ing lien" security interest would be handled under 547(b). Assume an
owner of a swim shop who ninety days before bankruptcy owes the se-
cured party $10,000 under a loan secured by the debtor's present and
after-acquired inventory and receivables. On this day, the secured party
has a perfected security interest in debtor's $4,000 inventory of swim-
suits and goggles. Eighty days later when the debtor files a Chapter 7
petition, the stock of inventory has completely turned over and the
$10,000 loan is now secured under the after-acquired property clause by
1. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, reprinted in
2 Collier on Bankruptcy 203 (15th Ed. 1979).
2. U.C.C. §§9-203, 9-303.
3. The four months preceding a bankruptcy filing under Section 60; 90 days (one year
for insider cases) under Section 547.
4. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
5. IA. Coogan, Hogan, Vagts & McDonnell, Secured Transactions Under the U.C.C.
§ 7.0412][B], 7-28 (1991).
6. Grain Merchants of Indiana v. Union Bank & Say. Co., Bellevue, Ohio, 408 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1969); Inre Nason, 13 B.R. 984 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981); Cissell v. First Nat. Bank
of Cincinnati, 471 F.Supp. 484 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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$8,000 worth of swim caps and kick boards.
Under 547(b) the trustee would claim a preference of $8,000. The
trustee must show that: (1) there was a transfer of property of the
debtor (2) to or for the benefit of the creditor, (3) on account of an
antecedent debt, (4) made within ninety days of bankruptcy, (5) while
the debtor was insolvent, and (6). with the effect of giving the creditor a
greater return on his debt than he would have received had the transfer
not occurred and the creditor received his recovery solely under the liqui-
dation provisions of the Code.
In this example the secured party has received an $8,000 dollar prefer-
ential transfer of a perfected security interest in the swim caps and kick
boards. Because of 547(e)(3) of the Code the inventory is not deemed
transferred "until the debtor acquires rights in the collateral"; in the
example, all $8,000 of inventory was "transferred" during the ninety-day
preference period (so much for DuBay). It was on account of an antece-
dent debt (the preexisting $10,000 loan), and was made while the debtor
was presumed to be insolvent under Section 547(f). 7 This same analysis
would apply for any case involving a floating lien. Section 547(e)(3)8
embraces and codifies the argument that was made unsuccessfully by
trustees before the Code, and overturns the basic holding in DuBay v.
Williams.9 Without 547(c) most security interests in after-acquired
property acquired within the preference period will be considered trans-
fers on account of an antecedent debt, and would be avoidable by the
trustee. Because the floating lien was such a common, efficient and im-
portant form of security, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
dared not allow it to be routinely destroyed as a preference.
But the drafters were confronted by directly conflicting arguments. On
one hand was the rationale of cases such as DuBay which said that no
floating liens were preferential. On the other was the trustee's old claim
that all security interests attaching to property acquired within the pref-
erence period should be preferential. Chaired by Professor Grant Gil-
more, the drafting committee reached a compromise. 10 This compromise
is a "safe harbor" from 547(b) for security interests in receivables, in-
ventory and their proceeds, Section 547(c)(5). The rule in (c)(5) is often
referred to as the "improvement in position test";" it is applied by com-
paring the creditor's status at two points. A creditor with a security in-
7. See, generally, Duncan, Preferential Transfers, the Floating Lien, and Section
547(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 36 ARK. L. REV. 18, 24 (1982-1983).
8. 11 U.S.C. 547(e)(3): For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
9. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
10. Report of the Committee on the Coordination of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and.
the Uniform Commercial Code (1970), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News,
6164-6179.
II. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, S. Rep. No. 95-
989, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1978), reprinted in 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 88 (15th Ed.
1979).
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terest in inventory and receivables is subject to a preference attack to the
extent he improves his position within ninety days of bankruptcy. To
measure the improvement one compares the secured party's position
ninety days before the filing of the petition (point 1) and the date of the
petition (point 2).12 A simplistic way to apply this test compares the dif-
ference between the debt and the value of the collateral ninety days
before bankruptcy with the difference at the date of bankruptcy. If the
former is greater than the latter, any transfers that caused a reduction in
this difference (between the debt and the value of the collateral) are
preferences not saved by (c)(5).
It is important to remember, however, that 547(c)(5) applies only to a
creditor who is undersecured ninety days before bankruptcy. The credi-
tor who is fully secured cannot be attacked under 547(b). There is no
initial deficiency and later transactions cannot improve the creditor's
position.
The commission described the (c)(5) compromise as follows:
Although there are drawbacks to the "improvement in position" exception,
it seems an appropriate compromise. It avoids the vice of the DuBay deci-
sion, which seemingly protects from preference attack any payment or se-
curing pursuant to an after-acquired property clause. And it does not im-
pose an inordinate burden on legitimate financing transactions, since the
burden of proof is expressly placed on the trustee to establish an improve-
ment in position by an increase in the value of the security at the expense of
the estate and the extent thereof.13
Let us start with a simple illustration: Suppose that ninety days before
bankruptcy the debtor, owner of a jewelry store, owed the secured party
$5,000,000 under an earlier perfected security agreement in the debtor's
present and future inventory. On this date (ninety days before bank-
ruptcy) the inventory had a value of $3,000,000. Before the date of
bankruptcy the debtor sold all of his inventory and acquired $4,000,000
of new inventory. One would apply the 547(c)(5) two point improvement
in position test as follows. There has been a $4,000,000 transfer of inven-
tory that would be voidable under (b). But the difference between the
debt and the collateral has been reduced from $2,000,000 ninety days
before bankruptcy ($5,000,000-$3,000,000) to $1,000,000 at the date of
bankruptcy ($5,000,000-$4,000,000). Thus (c)(5) saves $3,000,000 and
leaves a preference of only $1,000,000.
To begin to see the uncertainties, consider a variation: The debtor
12. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, H.R. Rep. No.
95-595, 95th Cong. Ist Sess. (1977), reprinted in 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 374 (15th Ed.
1979). Note that if new value was first given within 90 days of bankruptcy, the date on
which the new value was given substitutes for the 90-day point. See Lackow Brothers Inc.
v. Roentelmever (Matter of Lackow Bros., Inc.), 752 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11 th Cir. 1985).
13. Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Pt. II H.R.
Doc.No. 137, 93rd Cong., I st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 167 (15th
Ed. 1979).
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owed the secured party $2,000,000 under a preexisting loan secured by
debtor's present and after-acquired "inventory and receivables." Ninety
days prior to bankruptcy the secured party had a perfected security in-
terest in $1,500,000 of debtor's inventory. Forty-five days before bank-
ruptcy the debtor makes a payment to the secured party of $200,000.
Meanwhile, the debtor's inventory has turned over completely and stands
at $1,500,000. On the date of filing the petition, the debt is $1,800,000
secured by debtor's inventory of $1,500,000.
Section 547(b) calls for a preference of at least $1,500,000.14 A
mechanical application of the two point test in this case saves $1,300,000
of this amount and leads to the conclusion that the secured party has
received a preference of $200,000. But the transfer that caused a reduc-
tion in the gap between the value of the collateral and the debt of
$2,000,000 ninety days before bankruptcy ($2,000,000-$1,500,000), on
the date of bankruptcy ($1,800,000-$1,500,000) was the $200,000 pay-
ment, not so?
Careful reading shows that preferential payments are never saved by
(c)(5); it reads:
the trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(5) of a perfected security interest ... to the extent that the aggregate of
all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction.
Clearly the only transfers protected by (c)(5) are transfers of "a per-
fected security interest." But are only transfers of security interests ex-
amined when one is determining improvement in position by which the
creditor has benefited? In one sense the $1,500,000 of new inventory ac-
quired by the debtor in our example did "cause" a reduction in the dif-
ference between the debt and the collateral at the time the inventory was
acquired ($0 inventory to $1,500,000). However, the two point test looks
at the debt and collateral at two dates, ninety days before bankruptcy
and the date of bankruptcy. Under this test the acquisition of $1,500,000
inventory did not "cause" a reduction (ninety days $1,500,000, date of
petition, $1,500,000). If one ignores the payment, there is no voidable
preference arising from the after-acquired property because (c)(5) saves
the transfer. That is true despite the improved position.
The legislative history and other commentaries 5 on 547(c)(5) gener-
ally agree that only transfers of interest in collateral are saved. The
Commission report on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States states:
... the perfected security interest is not avoidable except to the extent that
the transferee has improved his position by an increase in the value of the
security at the expense of the estate. 6
14. If the $200,000 payment is not somehow saved by 547(c), it too will be preferential.
15. See Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the
Code, 17 Hous. L.REv. 289 (1980).
16. Supra note 13 at 210.
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This language and the language of the statute disregard payments made
to the creditor by the debtor because they are not transfers of security
made at the expense of the estate. In the words of Professor Nimmer,
"Despite its elegant simplicity, Section 547(c)(5) requires that the re-
duced deficiency be 'caused' by transfers of security.' ' 7
Here is the logic of this position. If a payment were allowed to be used
in calculating the reduction in the gap of collateral versus debt under
(c)(5), the creditor would be exposed to double liability with respect to
the payment. 8 First, the payment itself could be directly attacked as a
$200,000 transfer without regard to (c)(5). If it is taken into account a
second time-in calculating the "improved position" under section
547(c)(5)-the payment of $200,000 would produce a total preference of
$400,000.19 The payment made by the debtor to the creditor should be
treated separately and analyzed under 547(b) along with the exceptions
under 547(c).11
Consider a second example. Ninety days before bankruptcy the debtor
owes the creditor $2,000,000 and the loan is secured by $1,000,000 of
inventory. Eighty days before bankruptcy the creditor lends the debtor
an additional $1,000,000. Subsequently, but before bankruptcy, the col-
lateral has completely turned over and the inventory has a value of
$1,500,000 on the date of bankruptcy.
A mechanical application of the net improvement test would lead us to
the following result. Ninety days before bankruptcy the difference be-
tween the debt and the value of the collateral was $1,000,000
($2,000,000-$1,000,000) and on the date of the bankruptcy the differ-
ence between the debt and the value of the collateral was $1,500,000
($3,000,000-$1,500,000). Since the gap between the debt and the collat-
eral has widened, there is no improvement to the creditor; arguably,
therefore, the creditor is completely protected by the 547(c)(5)
exception.
But that conclusion is inconsistent with our analysis in example Num-
ber 1. In our first example, we argued that one should not include pay-
ments in calculating the debt at the date of bankruptcy. Yet in our
mechanical application of the formula to Number 2, we have included a
17. Nimmer, supra note 15 at 321.
18. See Duncan, Preferential Transfers, the Floating Lien, and Section 547(c)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 36 ARK.L.REv. 18, 27 (1982-1983).
19. This would be the case unless the payment was somehow saved by another exception
under 547(c).
In our hypothetical above, the analysis would be as follows: 90 days before bankruptcy
the difference between the debt and the value of the collateral was $500,000 ($2,000,000-
$1,500,000). and on the date of the petition the difference between the debt (disregarding
any payments) and the value of the collateral would still be $500,000 ($2,000,000-
$1,500,000).
20. If the trustee can show that the $200,000 payment meets all the requirements of
547(b) and is not saved by one of the exceptions of 547(c) then it would be a preference. In
this example the $200,000 would not be avoidable by the trustee if it were an "ordinary
course payment," 547(c)(2). II U.S.C. 547(c)(2) (Supp.IV 1980).
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payment going the other way (the new loan by the creditor to the
debtor). There is no reason here to treat variations upward in the debt
(new extensions of credit) any differently than one would treat variations
downward (payments by the debtor to the creditor). Just as the pay-
ments should be treated separately under 547(b) and under other excep-
tions in 547(c), so should new advances.
Under hypothetical number 2 the amount of the preference not saved
by (c)(5) arising from the transfer of after-acquired assets would be
$500,000. Ninety days before bankruptcy the gap between the debt and
the collateral was $1,000,000 ($2,000,000-$1,000,000), at the date of
bankruptcy and disregarding the new advance of $1,000,000, there is a
gap of $500,000 ($2,000,000-$1,500,000). The inventory build up may
have injured other creditors. Whether the new loan will insulate other
transfers to the creditor depends on 547(c)(4). 21
Necessarily, we reject some other interpretations of the improvement
in the position test under 547(c)(5). Does an "improvement in position"
occur when and only when the percentage of the creditor's debt secured
at the time of the petition exceeds the percentage secured ninety days
before bankruptcy? 22 We do not think so. Applying this analysis to hypo-
thetical number 2 leads to the following result: At ninety days before
bankruptcy the creditor was 50 percent secured ($2,000,000 debt and
$1,000,000 of collateral) and on the date of the petition the creditor was
50 percent secured ($3,000,000 of debt and $1,500,000 of collateral).
Using only a percentage test there would be no preference. This test does
not discriminate between changes caused by advances or payments and
those caused by after-acquired property.
To add to the mischief, consider a small twist on our earlier case.
Ninety days before bankruptcy, debtor owed the secured creditor
$2,000,000 under a preexisting loan secured by present and after-ac-
quired inventory. On this date the secured party has a perfected security
interest in debtor's $1,500,000 worth of inventory. Fifty days prior to
bankruptcy the debtor made a $500,000 cash payment to the secured
party, and by forty-five days before bankruptcy the inventory turns over
and grows to $2,000,000, where it stands on the date of bankruptcy.
What part of the $2,000,000 is saved by 547(c)(5)?
21. Another way to look at the problem is to regard the transfers of security interest and
all other transfers as completely separate transactions. Assume that the $1,000,000 in new
advances came not from the original secured creditor but from secured party 2, and assume
that the debtor gave secured creditor 2 a security interest in after-acquired inventory not
covered by secured party l's security interest. If, at the time of bankruptcy but subsequent
to the loan, the debtor had acquired $500,000 worth of inventory subject to secured party
2's security agreement, there would be a $500,000 voidable preference. Because new value
was given for the first time within the 90-day period, 547(c)(5)(B) would apply, and the
date the new value was given would act as the first point on the two point test, creating an
initial gap between the debt and collateral of $1,000,000 ($1,000,000-$0) and at the date
of the petition the gap would be $500,000 ($1,000,000-$500,000).
22. Barkley Clark seems to suggest so in Preferences Under the Old and New Bank-
ruptcy Acts, 12 UCC L.J. 154, 178 (1979-1980).
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Assume for the moment that a gap cannot be "reduced" below zero.
Increasing the value of the collateral above the amount of debt does not
injure other creditors. True? Ninety days before bankruptcy the debt
was $2,000,000 and the collateral was worth $1,500,000; at the date of
the petition, the debt was $2,000,000 (disregarding payments) and the
collateral was $2,000,000. Disregarding all payments, the gap here has
been reduced by $500,000, an improved position for the creditor that
would allow the trustee to avoid the entire $500,000 under 547(b) and
(c)(5).
But if one considers the payment as independent of the after-acquired
property transfer, he finds two preferences: one for the payment of
$500,000 and one attributable to the after-acquired property of
$500,000.23 This must be wrong. A creditor with a $500,000 unsecured
claim (the creditor's position ninety days before bankruptcy) should not
be able to experience more than a $500,000 preference. If one follows
our advice and considers the payments separately from the after-ac-
quired property, how does he find only a $500,000 preference? We are
not certain; perhaps only by a careful reading of the sixth requirement,
547(b)(5) (that enables the "creditor to receive more than [he] would
receive" on liquidation).
II. VITALITY OF OLD ANSWERS UNDER 547(c)(5)
Prior to 1978 secured creditors with interests in after-acquired collat-
eral sometimes defended against preference attacks by arguing that new
value had been given in the form of a release of old collateral in return
for the transfer of newly acquired collateral. Thus, for example, a debtor
might sell five automobiles and procure five replacement automobiles. In
such circumstances the creditor could argue that it had given new value
for its security interest in the after-acquired automobiles by permitting
the creditor to sell the old automobiles free of its security interest. If
these transactions were contemporaneous, there would be no antecedency
and thus no preference.
It is clear that the drafters intended to cover most cases such as these
under (c)(5), but there is nothing in the Code that explicitly discredits
the argument that was formerly made. Indeed, the reference in
547(a)(2) to new value and the statement that new value may constitute
the "release by a transfer of property previously transferred" suggests
that the argument is still alive..
Assume two transfers that would not be protected by (c)(5) but might
be saved by the new value rule. In the first the debtor acquires after-
acquired collateral during the preference period that is neither inventory
nor receivables (and so not covered by (c)(5)). A farmer trades in his old
combine (equipment) that was subject to a security interest in return for
23. Assuming the payment is not saved as an ordinary course payment or under one of
the other subsections of (c).
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a new one to which the security interest attaches under the after-ac-
quired property clause. If this transfer is preferential under (b), it is not
saved under (c)(5) for the security is not in "inventory or a receivable or
the proceeds of either." Second is the case in which (c)(5) does- not save
a transfer of after-acquired inventory because the unsecured gap is
closed (position improved) by the acquisition of additional inventory in
the ninety-day period.
Are either or both of these saved by the creditor's argument that new
value was given in the form of the release of the old collateral? The
creditor will argue specifically that there was no preference under (b)(2)
because the transfer was not on account of an antecedent debt, but
rather on account of current value, namely the release of the existing
collateral. Or the creditor might claim that the transfer is saved by
(c)(l) because the transfer was substantially contemporaneous and for
new value.
The creditor's argument in the combine case seems completely consis-
tent with law and policy. If the debtor chooses to give up an old combine
and get a new one, none of his other creditors is hurt by the fact that the
security interest that formerly attached to the old combine attaches to
the new.24
The second case is not as easy. The build-up of inventory case is ex-
actly the case made a preference by the new 547(b) and one intention-
ally not saved by (c)(5). One way to protect the transfer of the combine,
but not the building up of inventory is to require equivalence between
new value (inventory sold or released) and new collateral (new inventory
acquired). Thus, one might say that new value was given for the new
combine only to the extent of the value of the old. If a $25,000 combine
was traded for a $50,000 combine, only $25,000 of new value is given.
Yet under (b)(2) we seldom look behind the bargain to determine
whether one party appeared to give 100 for another's 90. In those cases
typically we assume that the value traded was equal and the antecedency
exists or it does not, but that it does not come in degrees.
Take the following example as illustrative: The debtor owes the se-
cured party $2,000,000 under a preexisting loan secured by debtor's pre-
sent and after-acquired "inventory and receivables." Under the security
agreement, the debtor must get authorization from the creditor to release
the collateral and obtain new collateral. Ninety days before bankruptcy
the secured party has a perfected security interest in debtor's $1,600,000
inventory. Thirty days before bankruptcy the debtor finds another
merchant willing to "swap" his inventory of swim caps and goggles, for
the debtor's swimsuits. The debtor and the merchant agree the inventory
is of "approximately the same value." Twenty-days before bankruptcy
the debtor acquires permission from the creditor to turn over the inven-
24. We are assuming here the debtor does not sweeten the security interest in the new
combine by increasing his equity with some additional cash paid to the seller of the
combine.
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tory in exchange for the inventory of swimcaps and goggles. The creditor
is unaware of the exact value of the new inventory. On the date of the
petition the debt is $2,000,000 secured by debtor's inventory of caps and
goggles with a value of $2,000,000.
When the trustee attacks this preference, the creditor could use
547(c)(5). Under a "net improvement" test, the creditor could save only
$1,600,000, the other $400,000 would be preferential.2 5 Measuring the
collateral and the debt ninety days before bankruptcy the gap was
$400,000 ($2,000,000 debt-$1,600,000 collateral). On the date of the pe-
tition the gap has been reduced to $0 ($2,000,000 debt-$2,000,000 col-
lateral). This reduction of $400,000 was caused by the "transfer" of a
security interest to the creditor.
The creditor can argue that (b)(2) has not been met, or that (c)(1)
applies and the entire $2,000,000 may be saved. If value need not be
precisely equivalent, it does not matter that the $1,600,000 of inventory
was traded for $2,000,000 of inventory. Because creditor gave new value
(releasing its lien on the old inventory) the creditor did not receive a
transfer for antecedent debt, and the entire transaction should be saved
by (b)(2).
In the alternative, the creditor might point to 547(c)(1). Inasmuch as
(c)(l) protects a transfer "to the extent" that the transfer satisfies the
requirements of the section, comparison of value may be invited by
(c)(1). 6 This reading of (c)(1) would save only $1,600,000 of the trans-
fer and leave $400,000 as preferential. Despite the language of (c)(l) a
preference of $400,000 in this situation does not necessarily serve the
purpose of (c)(1). A primary justification for 547(c)(1) is that a transac-
tion fitting the exception does not truly diminish the debtor's estate. If
the debtor's estate is diminished, then other creditors are hurt and the
transaction should be preferential. In our example, the debtor's estate
has not been diminished and no other creditors have been hurt. The se-
cured creditor would have received the collateral upon liquidation under
the security agreement and the increase in value of the collateral was
merely fortuitous. The debtor was able to find a merchant to swap inven-
tory of a higher value for inventory of a lesser value. This situation is
analogous to the creditor who benefits from a natural market increase in
his collateral prior to bankruptcy. Such a creditor is not penalized be-
cause of a fortuitous rise in the value of its collateral in the market
place.
We are not certain about the correct answers here. Surely the drafters
25. We assume that the $400,000 portion of the value would be "to the prejudice of
other creditors" under (c)(5).
26. The Tenth Circuit in In re Rodman, 792 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1986), concluded that
(c)(1) is met if the debtor gets any value for the exchange when the exchange takes place.
One may disagree with the court's reasoning in this case. The literal language of the defini-
tion of "'new value" does not necessarily include every release of an unavoidable transfer.
One may argue that the definition is limited to "moneys worth" and this definition implies
valuation.
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intended some restriction on the exchange of collateral notion or they
would not have included (c)(5) in the Code, but it seems equally clear
that some remnants of the pre-Code arguments survive.
III. DATE OF LIQUIDATION CONUNDRUM
Although Section 547(b) instructs one to compare what a particular
creditor received as a result of a transfer, with what that creditor would
have received on liquidation without that transfer, the statute does not
tell when this hypothetical liquidation should occur. In some cases it will
be important to know whether the hypothetical liquidation is deemed to
have occurred at the time of the alleged transfer, at the time the petition
was filed, or at some later time. There is some law on this question, but
it is not completely satisfactory.
Assume that fifty days before bankruptcy debtor pays off its
$2,000,000 secured debt. The debt was secured by General Motors stock
which is then worth $2,000,000. If the General Motors stock is worth
only $1,000,000 at bankruptcy, can the trustee successfully challenge the
payment to the secured creditor?
The payment to the secured creditor meets the requirements of
547(b)(1) through (4). Whether the trustee can meet (b)(5) turns on the
timing of the "hypothetical liquidation." If one concludes that the liqui-
dation occurs at the time of the payment, there is no preference because
(b)(5) is not met (a $2,000,000 payment on a debt secured by
$2,000,000 in collateral does not enable the creditor to do better than at
liquidation, if liquidation occurred at day fifty). If liquidation is deemed
to have occurred at the date of the petition, the trustee meets (b)(5).
Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown27 is often cited for the proposition
that liquidation is deemed to have occurred at the date of filing the peti-
tion. In Palmer Clay Products Co., the debtor, Metropolitan Builder's
Supply Company, made a partial payment of a creditor's claim during
the preference period. The creditor argued that the date of "hypothetical
liquidation" should be the date on which payment was made, .and the
payment should not be considered preferential "provided the debtor's as-
sets at the time of the payment would, if then liquidated and distributed,
be sufficient to pay all the creditors of the same class an equal proportion
[i.e., as much as Metropolitan Builder Supply received] of their
claims."2 Justice Brandeis rejected this argument:
Whether a creditor has received a preference is to be determined, not by
what the situation would have been if the debtor's assets had been liqui-
dated and distributed among his creditors at the time the alleged preferen-
tial payment was made, but by the actual effect of the payment as deter-
mined when bankruptcy results. The payment on account of say ten percent
27. 297 U.S. 227, 228 (1936).
28. Id. at 228.
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within the four months [four months was the preference period under Sec-
tion 601 will necessarily result in such creditor receiving a greater percent-
age than other creditors, if the distribution is less than 100 percent.2 9
The Court was clearly right in rejecting the creditor's claim, but we
would state the rule differently than Justice Brandeis did. By hypothesis
any unsecured creditor who receives a partial payment within the prefer-
ence period and does not simultaneously waive the remainder of its claim
will receive more than other similarly situated creditors who receive a
distribution only at bankruptcy. That would be true whether liquidation
were to occur the date the payment was made or at some later date. To
see why, consider the following example that illustrates the rationale of
the decision in Palmer. Suppose a debtor with assets of $1,000,000 has
ten unsecured creditors each owed $1,000,000 ninety days before bank-
ruptcy (a total of $1,000,000 in assets and $10,000,000 in debt). Forty-
five days before bankruptcy the debtor pays one creditor $100,000. On
the date of bankruptcy $900,000 remains in the pool of assets to be dis-
tributed to the creditors. Under the creditor's argument in Palmer, be-
cause there are ten creditors, each is going to receive a ten percent divi-
dend from the pool of assets at bankruptcy. Each would receive
1,000,000 or $100,000. Therefore, when Creditor I was paid $100,000,
the other n;ne creditors could have received $100,000 each on
liquidation.
To see the flaw in this reasoning, follow this creditor's argument to its
conclusion. By receiving $100,000 before bankruptcy, the creditor re-
ceives a 10 percent dividend but retains an unpaid claim of $900,000. On
bankruptcy there will be $900,000 in the estate, the other nine unsecured
creditors will each assert claims of $1 million, and Creditor 1, who re-
ceived the $100,000 payment, will assert a claim of $900,000. In the
bankruptcy liquidation therefore, Creditor I would receive an additional
$81,818 for a total of $181,818. The other nine creditors by comparison
would receive only $90,909. Clearly it is no answer to a preference claim
that the amount of one's payment was less than the amount one would
have received if there were liquidation on the date he received the pay-
ment. That is because he will take that payment and yet another one on
bankruptcy and so will be preferred over the other parties.
The creditor in Palmer Clay Products Co. did not give up its claim.
What if the creditor had forsaken all future claims against the debtor in
return for the payment? Would the Supreme Court have still found that
payment to be a preference to Creditor 1? If Creditor 1 had made this
promise to forsake all future claims then the remaining creditors would
have received $100,000 on the date of bankruptcy (1/9th of $900,000),
the same amount they would have received had the payment not been
made to Creditor 1 (1/10th of $1,000,000). In that case a court could
find that the date of "hypothetical distribution" should be the date at
29. Id. at 229.
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which the payment is made. When one considers a secured creditor who
is paid, as in our example, the timing becomes critical.
In re Tenna Corp."0 also bears on this question. Tenna Corporation
had made a $527,264.37 payment to the IRS for back taxes; the trustee
claimed that the payment was preferential. After Tenna had filed in
Chapter 11 it borrowed substantial funds to continue its operation and
granted the lenders superpriority liens on all of its property. 1 The effect
of these liens was to reduce the dividend that could ultimately be paid to
unsecured creditors from the amount that would have been paid if liqui-
dation had occurred on the date of the petition. Several months after the
postpetition loans had been made, Tenna's trustee attacked the IRS pay-
ment as preferential. The trustee argued: "the date of the hearing on the
adversary proceeding is the appropriate testing date because 547(b) re-
quires that the actual anticipated distribution to all creditors owed by
the debtor be included in the determination. ' 32 The IRS claimed that "a
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation can be constructed as of the date the
petition in bankruptcy was filed."3 3 The district court determined that
the appropriate date should be the date of the adversary proceeding and
found the payment a preference. 34 The superpriority liens were superior
to the IRS liens, and because these liens had a value greater than that of
the estate at the date of the adversary proceeding, payments to the IRS
were preferential as they were made within the preference period and
were to the benefit of the IRS. The Court of Appeals reversed and stated
that using the date of the adversary proceeding would be "inconceivable
and illogical," for it would allow the trustee to manipulate the time of
the proceedings so as to ensure that the transfer was a preference."
Therefore, the court found that the date of the petition in bankruptcy
should be the testing date for the "hypothetical distribution."
Because we assert that the date of the hypothetical liquidation should
be before the date of the petition, Tenna does not speak directly to or
conflict with our case. But what about Palmer Clay Products Co.? It is
similar to the illustration we have put forth, and it points to the date of
the petition in bankruptcy, not to the date of the payment.
In our illustration ($2,000,000 payment on a loan secured by
$2,000,000 in stock), the trustee might argue that the secured creditor
has received a $1,000,000 preference. The creditor was paid $2,000,000
fifty days prior to bankruptcy, yet it would have received only
$1,000,000 (the value of the collateral on the date the petition was filed)
together with a distribution to unsecured creditors if liquidation took
place on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed. However, as Justice
Brandeis stated in Palmer Clay Products Co., the "hypothetical liquida-
30. 801 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1986).
31. Id. at 820.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 821.
34. In re Tenna Corp., 53 B.R. 493 (D.C. Ohio 1984).
35. In re Tenna Corp., 801 F.2d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 1986).
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tion" is not measured at the time of the actual payment, but by "the
actual-effect of the payment when bankruptcy results. . . . A payment
which enables the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than any other of such creditors . . . is a preference. ' ' 6
Must the payment cause the creditor to receive a greater share? In
our illustration the combination of the payment and the decline in value
of the collateral causes the secured creditor to receive a greater portion
of its debt at the time of payment than it would have received if it had
waited. In our illustration the creditor was fully secured. Had there been
no payment but the collateral had still been worth $2,000,000 at the date
of bankruptcy, the creditor would have received $2,000,000. Only be-
cause the collateral declined in value by the date of the petition did the
creditor receive a greater amount than it would have received on liquida-
tion at the date of the bankruptcy petition. In our example, the secured
creditor who has been paid will not have any future claims. It will make
no claim to the "pool" of assets at the date of the petition in bankruptcy
as would the creditor in Palmer Clay Products Co.
What arguments support the date of transfer as the date of the poten-
tial liquidation? One way to approach the question is to ask who bears
the risk of depreciation. In our illustration, the secured creditor has ac-
cepted full satisfaction of its debt ($2,000,000) and relinquished its right
to any future claims against the debtor. When the collateral declines in
value ($1,000,000 at the date of bankruptcy) the unsecured creditors
suffer the loss by receiving a smaller payout from the trustee. Where
there are secured and unsecured creditors, is it not appropriate that the
unsecured creditors bear the risk of the decline in value of the collateral
after the secured creditor has been paid? The unsecured creditors also
reap the gain from appreciation. If, in our illustration, the collateral
were worth $4,000,000 at the date of bankruptcy instead of $1,000,000,
each of the unsecured creditors would gain from the increase in the value
of the collateral at the date of bankruptcy, while the secured creditor
would have no claim to the excess.
A second way to approach the policy question is to treat the secured
creditor as the owner of an interest in the collateral. When the creditor
took an original security interest in the collateral and loaned debtor
$2,000,000, there was a conveyance to the creditor.37 Arguably, the
debtor's payment causes a reconveyance of the collateral from the credi-
tor to the debtor, thus making the reconveyance end the transaction and
no later events should change it.
To show that we are not merely apologists for secured creditors, con-
sider a second case. Assume there is $2,000,000 of debt fifty days before
bankruptcy, but the General Motors stock is worth only $1,000,000. On
that day debtor pays creditor $2,000,000. Between the fiftieth day and
36. Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227, 229 (1936).
37. U.C.C. §9-203. Under 9-203 the debtor has made a conveyance by granting a secur-
ity interest to the creditor.
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the date of bankruptcy, the General Motors stock appreciates to
$2,000,000. What result now? To be consistent we must say that the
liquidation should be deemed to have occurred on the date the payment
was made fifty days prior to bankruptcy. The creditor has received a
$1,000,000. preference. In the hypothetical given, all of the appreciation
between the fiftieth day and the date of bankruptcy should go to the
unsecured creditors, not so?
A final reason for treating the date of the payment as the date when
the hypothetical liquidation is the anomalous result that would otherwise
occur if the creditor takes collateral in full satisfaction instead of taking
payment of the debt. Assume in our original example the creditor agreed
to discharge the liability in return for a quitclaim to the collateral. Pre-
sumably that would not be a preference, since the asset would no longer
belong to the estate, and there would be no question of liquidation on the
date the petition was filed. If the secured creditor, having taken the col-
lateral in full satisfaction, sold it the next day, it would be fully satisfied.
If it held the stock until it declined, that would be the creditor's loss.
None of these. things would be of any concern to the debtor or the un-
secured creditors.
If we do not choose the date of the transfer as the date of the hypo-
thetical liquidation, one gets indefensible differences between the credi-
tor who takes the collateral in full satisfaction and the creditor who takes
the payment instead. Neither of the creditors has hurt the estate because
neither will be making any future claims on the estate.
IV. INDIRECT BENEFIT CONUNDRUM
The possibility that a payment to one creditor can be a preference to
another and so recoverable from either poses delightful problems. Some
of these are examined in the notorious Deprizio case.3 8 We carry on from
that case. Assume the following: Ninety days before bankruptcy, Credi-
tor 1, a senior creditor, has a $600,000 loan secured by the debtor's in-
ventory worth $600,000. Creditor 2, a junior secured creditor, is owed
$200,000 and has a security interest in the same inventory. Seventy days
before bankruptcy, the debtor pays Creditor 1 in full, and Creditor 1
releases his security interest in the collateral. Since the debt was fully
secured ($600,000-$600,000 value of collateral) the trustee cannot at-
tack the payment directly because of 547(b)(5).
But Section 547(b)(1) states that a transfer is avoidable "if it is to or
for the benefit of a creditor." This section does not limit "creditor" to
Creditor 1 who received the payment. The "benefit" can be to any credi-
tor of the debtor. If the trustee can show that Creditor 2 was benefited
by the payment to Creditor 1, the trustee can avoid the payment as pref-
erential. Worse, if the payment is preferential, Section 550 allows the
trustee to recover it from either the initial transferee (Creditor 1) or the
38. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
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"entity for whose benefit such transfer was made" (Creditor 2).31 This
would allow the trustee to force either Creditor 1 or Creditor 2 to make
the payment in the amount of the preference to the trustee's pool of
assets to be distributed at bankruptcy.40
Following the approach in Deprizio, the trustee in our hypothetical
will attack the payment in full to Creditor 1 as preferential to Creditor 2
because the payment transformed Creditor 2 from an unsecured creditor
to a fully secured creditor. This would create a preference under Section
547. Turning to Section 550 the trustee will argue that it can recover
from either the initial transferee (Creditor 1) or the beneficiary of the
transfer (Creditor 2). This case poses several problems. First, should the
payment to the senior creditor be a preference to the junior creditor?
Second, when should the recipient of the transfer (Creditor 1) have to
repay the money to the trustee under Section 550? Third, when there are
two creditors and payment to one benefits another, how does one apply
39. §550 states: ... (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section . . .547 . . .the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the
estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so offers, the value of such property,
from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made; or...
II U.S.C. § 550 (Supp. IV (1980).
40. In Levit v. Ingersoll Rand ("Deprizio"), 874 F.2d 1186 F.2d (7th Cir. 1989) the
debtor company, Deprizio Construction, went bankrupt. Deprizio had obtained many of its
loans from creditors by having Richard Deprizio, the President of the company, guarantee
the loans. Between ninety days and one year before the date of bankruptcy, Deprizio Con-
struction had made payments on three types of obligations: (I) obligations guaranteed by
Richard Deprizio; (2) tax obligations; and (3) pension fund obligations. The trustee argued
that these transfers were preferential as they had been made to the benefit of an inside
creditor, Richard Deprizio, and made within one year of bankruptcy (the preference period
for insiders). The trustee stated that a guarantor is a creditor under the Code because a
creditor is anyone holding a claim against the debtor. The guarantor holds a "contingent
claim" against the debtor that becomes fixed when the guarantor pays the creditor whose
claim was guaranteed. By the debtor's paying off loans subject to the guarantee, the guar-
antor had benefitted because the payment reduced the exposure of the guarantor. Conse-
quently, all payments made by the debtor directly to oblige a guaranteed obligation are
avoidable as transfers not only "to" the creditor, but "for the benefit of" the creditor guar-
antor. The trustee argued that despite the fact that the payment was to an outside creditor
and before the ninety day preference period, the payment was still preferential because the
effect was to benefit an insider, whose preference period is one year.
In the major portion of the court's opinion, Judge Easterbrook agreed with the trustee,
holding that transfers preferentially benefitting insider guarantors are voidable when such
transfers take place more than ninety days before filing a petition, but within one year of
bankruptcy. Any such guarantor has an incentive to favor (pay off) guaranteed loans as
compared with other loans.
The creditors of the guaranteed loans argued that each payment was two "trans-
fers"--one to the creditor and another to the guarantor, and that the only transfer avoida-
ble under § 547 is the one to the guarantor. Judge Easterbrook disposed of this argument
stating that there was no legislative history to support this argument. He found a single
payment to be one transfer, "no matter how many people gain thereby."
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Section 547(c)?
SHOULD THE PAYMENT TO CREDITOR 1 BE A PREFERENCE
TO CREDITOR 2?
Suppose that the debtor pays off Creditor 1, takes possession of and
dissipates the collateral between the date of payment to the fully secured
creditor (Creditor 1) and the date of bankruptcy. The trustee will claim
that the junior creditor has "benefited" from the payment to Creditor 1
because the junior creditor's status has been improved to that of a senior
creditor with respect to the collateral. However, Creditor 2 may respond
that although its status was theoretically improved, it has not actually
benefited because the c6llateral has been dissipated.
This case is slightly different than Deprizio, where the guarantor al-
most certainly received an actual benefit. If, at the date of bankruptcy,
there were enough assets to pay off all creditors who had loans guaran-
teed by Mr. Deprizio, then he has not received an actual benefit by caus-
ing payment of a guaranteed loan. However, if the assets are not enough
to pay off these creditors, then any payments to creditors whose debts he
guaranteed would result in an "actual benefit" to Mr. Deprizio.
How should courts define "benefit" under 547(b)(1)? Will benefit be
anything that potentially benefits the creditor, or only those things that
actually benefit the creditor? In our example, it is plausible to say that
because there was no actual benefit to Creditor 2, the transfer was not a
preference. If one is to adopt the approach that the definition of benefit
means only actual benefit, the courts will then have to decide if all actual
benefits will constitute a preferential transfer. In Deprizio, Judge Easter-
brook provided this example:4' Lender 1 extends credit for security;
Lender 2 has a junior security interest. Lender 2 is backed by.aguaran-
tee. Each payment to Lender 1 increases the security available to Lender
2, which in turn produces a benefit to the guarantor by reducing its ex-
posure. Without directly answering the question, Judge Easterbrook im-
plied that the trustee would have an uphill battle in finding a preference.
He states: "The benefit in such a case is negligible at best, so the case
for recapture is weak." '42 This analysis implies that the courts should
somehow measure the probable benefit to decide whether a preference
has occurred. We endorse such an inquiry and believe wholesale avoid-
ance would be law gone mad.
SHOULD CREDITOR 1 HAVE TO REPAY THE AMOUNT OF THE
TRANSFER TO THE TRUSTEE UNDER SECTION 550?
If one concludes that there is a preferential transfer under Section
41. Id. at 1200.
42. Id.
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547, Section 550 allows recovery of the transfer from either Creditor 1
or Creditor 2. Both Creditor 1 and Creditor 2 have good reasons to balk
at having to repay any amount of money to the trustee. Creditor 1 will
argue that it is a victim of an unforseen circumstance. Creditor 1 was
fully secured; had there been no junior creditor, the payment it received
would not have been preferential under Section 547(b)(5) .4  Note that
the creditors in Deprizio were not merely victims of circumstance; it is
likely that they never would have received payment but for the guaran-
tee that stimulated the corporate officers to pay some and omit others.
The guarantor presumably manipulated the debtor's payments to satisfy
guaranteed obligations first. Simply because a junior creditor exists, the
effect of a payment to a fully secured senior creditor should not change.
Why should the trustee benefit from the fortuitous event of having a
junior creditor? Creditor 2 may argue that it had no way of knowing
that Creditor 1 had been paid in full and surely had no control over that
payment. An amendment to Section 550 contained in a bill that passed
the Senate in June of 1992, but has not yet passed the House, would
protect the first creditor by requiring trustee to show that all of the ele-
ments of Section 547(b) are satisfied as to the first transferee. 4
We are doubtful of the case against Creditor 2. We are certain that no
recovery should be permitted from Creditor 1.
APPLYING THE 547(c) EXCEPTIONS IN Two CREDITOR
CASES
Assume that the payments by the debtor to Creditor 1 were "ordinary
course" payments under Section 547(c)(2), and so not preferential.4 5 If
the payment to Creditor 1 was no longer preferential, does this mean the
43. Section 547(b)(5) states that in order for a transfer to be a preference the transfer
must
(5) enable such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if -
(a) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
44. Section' 550 of title II U.S.C. Sec. 204. Preferences. S.1985. Cong.Rec., June 17,
1992 S.- 8359.
Section 550 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-
(I) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (c), (d), (e)
and (f), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection:
.(b) The trustee may recover under subsection (a) a transfer avoided under
section 547(b) from a first transferee or an immediate or mediate transferee on a
first transferee only to the extent that-
"(I) all the elements of section 547(b) are satisfied as to the first trans-
.feree; and
"(2) the exceptions in section 547(c) do not protect the first transferee.".
45. Section 547(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer ...
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or finan-
cial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; ...
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transfer is no longer preferential to Creditor 2? In re H & S Transp
Co., Inc.46 suggests so. Debtor, H & S, operated tug boats leased from,
United Liberty Life Insurance and Brent Towing Company. H & S filed
for bankruptcy on September 4, 1981. Within ninety days of bankruptcy,
H & S had paid various fuel suppliers for fuel purchased on credit. Mar-
itime law gave these fuel suppliers a maritime lien that had preference
over interests of the lessors, United and Brent. In effect these rules made
the fuel suppliers our "Creditor 1" and the lessors our "Creditor 2" from
the previous example.
The trustee claimed that the payments by H & S to the fuel suppliers
released these maritime liens, and were an indirect preference to the
subordinate claimants, United and Brent. The court held that payments
made by H & S to the fuel suppliers during the ninety day preference
period could not be recovered from those suppliers because "sufficient
amounts of new value were extended [to H & S] subsequent to the pref-
erential transfers to offset the transfers. '4 7 United and Brent argued that
the trustee was also precluded from recovering the transfer from them.
The bankruptcy court disagreed, stating that two preferential transfers
may result from one transaction. The United States District Court over-
ruled; it rejected the "two transfer" theory. Stating that the courts have
found that a single payment is one transfer no matter how many people
benefit, the court allowed Brent and United to use the suppliers' "new
value" defense. "To allow recovery also from United and Brent would
amount to two satisfactions of a single transfer. 48
The H & S case relies in part on Judge Easterbrook's holding and
dictum in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.49 In a long dictum
Judge Easterbrook endorses the proposition that the second or "benefit-
ted" creditor is protected by the full security of the original creditor or
by any of the exceptions that the original creditor (Creditor 1) can assert
under 547(c). Thus, if the payments are ordinary course payments pro-
tected vis 6 vis Creditor 1 under 547(c)(2), they are not preferential
under Creditor 2 either.
The difficulty with carrying Judge Easterbrook's dictum to the case of
H & S and to our hypothetical is that he was contemplating the position
of the guarantor of the debt, not the position of a subordinate secured
creditor. When the payment to a creditor releases a guarantee against
that debt, but is not preferential (because, for example, the creditor is
secured), no other creditor can be injured by this transaction and the
guarantor should clearly be protected from any preference claim. The
II U.S.C. 547(c)(2)(Supp. IV 1980).
46. 110 B.R. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). See also. In re H & S Transp. Co., Inc., 80 B.R.
441 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987), reversed and vacated, In re H & S Transp. Co., Inc., 90
B.R. 309 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); reversed by In re H & S Transp. Co. Inc., 878 F.2d 381 (6th
Cir. 1989), on remand, In re H & S Transp. Co., Inc. 110 B.R. 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
47. Id. at 830.
48. Id. at 832.
49. 874 F.2d 1186, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1989).
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same is not true when the party benefited by the payment is a
subordinate secured creditor with a different claim. In the first case the
payment releases the collateral to the general creditors. In the second
case (that involving a subordinate secured creditor) the asset is not re-
leased to the general creditors, but instead goes to the subordinate se-
cured creditor who was formerly unsecured and who by the transfer be-
comes partly or wholly secured. Thus, the cases are distinguishable and
the latter cases are not as easy as the former.
One might argue that even though there is only one transfer and even
though the transfer is not preferential as to the first claimant because of
547(b)(5) (or because of one of the exceptions in (c)), it could neverthe-
less be preferential as to the second party (the benefited creditor) and
that person would have to demonstrate its own defense. While we are
sympathetic to the outcome in H & S and are generally doubtful that
indirect preferences of the kind that might result when there is payment
of the first secured creditor to the second should be recognized, we do
not believe that Judge Easterbrook's reasoning can be carried through
wholesale. The proposed amendment to Section 550 discussed above in
footnote 44 would also protect the initial transferee if that transferee fit
under any of the exceptions to 547(c). It would not, however, protect our
second subordinate secured creditor who is indirectly benefited.
V. CONCLUSION
Labeling these questions conundrums signals our uncertainty about
the proper outcomes. While we are certain about what the law ought to
be, we are less certain about what it is. We will have fulfilled our job if
we have demonstrated the silliness of the outcomes that might occur if
Sections 547 and 550 are driven to their extreme.
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